The notion of superhigh computably enumerable (c.e.) degrees was first introduced by (Mohrherr in Z Math Logik Grundlag Math 32: 5–12, 1986) where she proved the existence of incomplete superhigh c.e. degrees, and high, but not superhigh, c.e. degrees. Recent research shows that the notion of superhighness is closely related to algorithmic randomness and effective measure theory. Jockusch and Mohrherr proved in (Proc Amer Math Soc 94:123–128, 1985) that the diamond lattice can be embedded into the c.e. tt-degrees preserving 0 (...) and 1 and that the two atoms can be low. In this paper, we prove that the two atoms in such embeddings can also be superhigh. (shrink)

The potential health risks of vegan diets specifically for women and children are discussed. Women and children are at higher risk of malnutrition from consumption of unsupplemented vegan diets than are adult males. Those who are very young, pregnant, lactating, elderly, or who suffer from poverty, disease or other environmentally induced disadvantages are at special risk. The size of these risks is difficult to quantify from existing studies. Fortunately the risk of dietary deficiency disease can be avoided and the potential (...) health benefits of vegan diets can be realized when diets for these groups are planned in line with theRecommended Dietary Allowances so that nutrient intakes reach or exceed recommended levels, and access to preventive and curative health services is assured. (shrink)

Review by: Johanna N. Y. Franklin The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 19, Issue 1, Page 115-118, March 2013.

We study arithmetic and hyperarithmetic degrees of categoricity. We extend a result of E. Fokina, I. Kalimullin, and R. Miller to show that for every computable ordinal $\alpha$, $\mathbf{0}^{}$ is the degree of categoricity of some computable structure $\mathcal{A}$. We show additionally that for $\alpha$ a computable successor ordinal, every degree $2$-c.e. in and above $\mathbf{0}^{}$ is a degree of categoricity. We further prove that every degree of categoricity is hyperarithmetic and show that the index set of structures with degrees (...) of categoricity is $\Pi_{1}^{1}$-complete. (shrink)

We give several characterizations of Schnorr trivial sets, including a new lowness notion for Schnorr triviality based on truth-table reducibility. These characterizations allow us to see not only that some natural classes of sets, including maximal sets, are composed entirely of Schnorr trivials, but also that the Schnorr trivial sets form an ideal in the truth-table degrees but not the weak truth-table degrees. This answers a question of Downey, Griffiths and LaForte.

We study the connection between Schnorr triviality and genericity. We show that while no 2-generic is Turing equivalent to a Schnorr trivial and no 1-generic is tt-equivalent to a Schnorr trivial, there is a 1-generic that is Turing equivalent to a Schnorr trivial. However, every such 1-generic must be high. As a corollary, we prove that not all K-trivials are Schnorr trivial. We also use these techniques to extend a previous result and show that the bases of cones of Schnorr (...) trivial Turing degrees are precisely those whose jumps are at least 0". (shrink)

We show that every countable ideal of degrees that are low for isomorphism is contained in a principal ideal of degrees that are low for isomorphism by adapting an exact pair construction. We further show that within the hyperimmune free degrees, lowness for isomorphism is entirely independent of computable traceability.

We show that van Lambalgen's Theorem fails with respect to recursive randomness and Schnorr randomness for some real in every high degree and provide a full characterization of the Turing degrees for which van Lambalgen's Theorem can fail with respect to Kurtz randomness. However, we also show that there is a recursively random real that is not Martin-Löf random for which van Lambalgen's Theorem holds with respect to recursive randomness.

We investigate the relationship between lowness for Schnorr randomness and Schnorr triviality. We show that a real is low for Schnorr randomness if and only if it is Schnorr trivial and hyperimmune free.

The weakly random reals contain not only the Schnorr random reals as a subclass but also the weakly 1-generic reals and therefore the n -generic reals for every n . While the class of Schnorr random reals does not overlap with any of these classes of generic reals, their degrees may. In this paper, we describe the extent to which this is possible for the Turing, weak truth-table, and truth-table degrees and then extend our analysis to the Schnorr random and (...) hyperimmune reals. (shrink)

We introduce several highness notions on degrees related to the problem of computing isomorphisms between structures, provided that isomorphisms exist. We consider variants along axes of uniformity, inclusion of negative information, and several other problems related to computing isomorphisms. These other problems include Scott analysis (in the form of back-and-forth relations), jump hierarchies, and computing descending sequences in linear orders.

A real is Martin-Löf (Schnorr) random if it does not belong to any effectively presented null ${\Sigma^0_1}$ (recursive) class of reals. Although these randomness notions are very closely related, the set of Turing degrees containing reals that are K-trivial has very different properties from the set of Turing degrees that are Schnorr trivial. Nies proved in (Adv Math 197(1):274–305, 2005) that all K-trivial reals are low. In this paper, we prove that if ${{\bf h'} \geq_T {\bf 0''}}$ , then h (...) contains a Schnorr trivial real. Since this concept appears to separate computational complexity from computational strength, it suggests that Schnorr trivial reals should be considered in a structure other than the Turing degrees. (shrink)

"_Heidegger and Modernity_ is an intervention in the Heidegger debate in France which many may see as decisive. Its central claim is that the responses of left Heideggerians to continuing disclosures regarding Heidegger's Nazi affiliations fail to come to terms with central ambiguities in his philosophical responses, both early and late, to modernity and technology.... Incisive and hard hitting, Luc Ferry and Alain Renault have condensed in a short and tightly organized book both a judicious and well-informed account of the (...) Heidegger question and an implicit defence of humanism which has a strong political resonance."—Liam O'Sullivan, _Political Studies_. (shrink)

What is the common element linking the right to health care and the right of free speech, the right to leisure and the right of free association, the right to work and the right to be protected? Debates on the rights of man abound in the media today, but all too often they remain confused and fail to recognize the fundamental political conceptions on which they hinge. Several French theorists have recently attempted a new account of rights, one that would (...) replace the discredited Marxist view of rights as mere formalities concealing the realities of class domination. In this final volume of _Political Philosophy_, Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut summarize these efforts and put forward their own set of arguments. (shrink)

Because contemporary political philosophy owes a significant debt to the great nineteenth-century German philosophies of history, a sound knowledge of German Idealist philosophy is crucial to an understanding of our own time. In _Political Philosophy 2_, Luc Ferry provides not only a thorough introduction to German Idealism and its critics, but also an insightful look at contemporary political philosophy. Ferry begins this second volume of his ambitious three-volume _Political Philosophy _by considering both the structure and the potential political effects of (...) the various philosophies of history born of German Idealism. He focuses on the key question of whether, and to what extent, the principle of reason may be said to govern the totality of the historically real. This leads to an examination of Hegel's criticism of the moral view of the world and to an assessment of the phenomenological criticism of Hegel put forth by Heidegger and Arendt. (shrink)

This is the first English translation of Condillac's most influential works: the Essay on the Origins of Human Knowledge and Course for Study of Instruction of the Prince of Parma. The Essays lay the foundation for Condillac's theory of mind. He argues that all mental operations are, in fact, sensory processes and nothing more. An outgrowth of Locke's empirical account of ideas and sensations as a source of knowledge, Condillac's theory goes beyond Locke's foundations, introducing his universal method for understanding (...) any complex entity: the reduction of all matters to their origins and then to their simplest forms. The Course, originally written to teach Prince Ferdinand of Parma to think and to develop good habits of mind following the principle of association of ideas, covers grammar, writing, reasoning, thinking, and ancient and modern history. Philip writes in the introduction: "[the] mind is moldable to reason and to 'nature' which gave it a model and provides the ultimate authority for all it can know or do.". (shrink)

If the problem of evil is one of justifying how a perfect God could create evil, then there is no problem of evil in early Chinese thought, but my claim in this paper is that the problem of evil is one manifestation of a deeper problem, which is the conflict between the world and human values and desires. This deeper problem appears in early Chinese thought in ways analogous to the problem of evil in theistic traditions. Daoists respond to this (...) problem with a call to harmonize with heaven by overcoming conventional values and desires. Mencius, a Confucian, offers a more complex response, in which it is natural to cultivate virtue and certain desires even though nature itself is indifferent to them. My paper focuses on this Confucian response. (shrink)

: Bioethicists have failed to understand the pervasively paternalistic character of research ethics. Not only is the overall structure of research review and regulation paternalistic in some sense; even the way informed consent is sought may imply paternalism. Paternalism has limits, however. Getting clear on the paternalism of research ethics may mean some kinds of prohibited research should be reassessed.

Accepted medical practice already violates the dead donor rule. Explicitly jettisoning the rule—allowing vital organs to be extracted, under certain conditions, from living patients—is a radical change only at the conceptual level. But it would expand the pools of eligible organ donors.

Conventional medical ethics and the law draw a bright line distinguishing the permitted practice of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from the forbidden practice of active euthanasia by means of a lethal injection. When clinicians justifiably withdraw life-sustaining treatment, they allow patients to die but do not cause, intend, or have moral responsibility for, the patient's death. In contrast, physicians unjustifiably kill patients whenever they intentionally administer a lethal dose of medication. We argue that the differential moral assessment of these two practices (...) is based on a series of moral fictions – motivated false beliefs that erroneously characterize withdrawing life-sustaining treatment in order to bring accepted end-of-life practices in line with the prevailing moral norm that doctors must never kill patients. When these moral fictions are exposed, it becomes apparent that conventional medical ethics relating to end-of-life decisions is radically mistaken. (shrink)

Against the widely affirmed dictum, “all existential statements can be denied without self-contradiction,” this essay argues for some existential statements being necessarily true semantically and thus for transcendental metaphysics in the strict sense. Having briefly reviewed how Ronald Dworkin, Karl-Otto Apel, and Thomas Nagel each affirm the dictum in question and, thereby, imply the possible truth of the statement, “nothing exists,” the essay seeks to show how the statement, “‘nothing exists’ is possibly true”, is pragmatically self-refuting. Against the implications of (...) subjectivity as such, that statement implies the impossibility of knowing any existential statement; that is, knowing what exists or, indeed, whether anything exists is forever denied to us. The dictum is, therefore, itself impossible, and the essay concludes with the assertion that transcendental metaphysics should be neoclassical. (shrink)

The practice of voluntary physician‐assisted death as a last resort is compatible with doctors' duties to practice competently, to avoid harming patients unduly, to refrain from medical fraud, and to preserve patients' trust. It therefore does not violate physicians' professional integrity.

This book, first published in 1968, examines the complicated issues which surround the problem of freewill. Although it reaches a libertarian conclusion, its focus is largely on other questions. What ultimately is at stake in this debate? What difference would it make whether we had freewill or not? Why must disagreement persist, and why do philosophes each opposed conclusions with such confidence? The answers to these questions open new perspectives.

Surgical clinical trials have seldom used a “sham” or placebo surgical procedure as a control, owing to ethical concerns. Recently, several ethical commentators have argued that sham surgery is either inherently or presumptively unethical. In this article I contend that these arguments are mistaken, and that there are no sound ethical reasons for an absolute prohibition of sham surgery in clinical trials. Reflecting on three cases of sham surgery, especially on the recently reported results of a sham-controlled trial of arthroscopic (...) surgery for arthritis of the knee, I present an ethical analysis that focuses on the methodological rationale for use of sham surgery, risk-benefit assessment, and informed consent. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps, and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may (...) freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Surgical clinical trials have seldom used a "sham" or placebo surgical procedure as a control, owing to ethical concerns. Recently, several ethical commentators have argued that sham surgery is either inherently or presumptively unethical. In this article I contend that these arguments are mistaken and that there are no sound ethical reasons for an absolute prohibition of sham surgery in clinical trials. Reflecting on three cases of sham surgery, especially on the recently reported results of a sham-controlled trial of arthroscopic (...) surgery for arthritis of the knee, I present an ethical analysis that focuses on the methodological rationale for use of sham surgery, risk-benefit assessment, and informed consent. (shrink)

Postmodernism is an attitude of suspicion, indeed of unteachable suspicion, in the face of evidence.